Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the expansion of the European Union eastward, there has been little need for individual European nations to maintain strong, mass armed forces. Between December 1991 and 2011-12, primarily western EU states formally ended conscription as a legal practice. This was done in light of the changing of global power structures with the United States assuming a position of global hegemon in a unipolar world.
However, since the Russian invasion of Crimea in February and March of 2014 European trends have reversed. This shift has not been abrupt or uniform but has rather followed a gradual and understated return. This change was not caused by a change in ideology, or ideological difference between European states as has happened in the past but rather in response to security threats, the recruitment crisis and shifting geopolitical expectations.
From Mass mobilisation to professional forces
Following the conclusion of the Second World War Europe was split between the two global superpowers, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. This division, which became a key feature of the Cold War, saw stringent divisions arise between East and West. It was assumed that if any war were to take place between the two superpowers the primary battle fields would fall across the European continent. Both Western and Eastern countries introduced conscription as a means to prepare their respective populations for the scenario of total war. Conscription allowed states to train millions of reservists and maintain their training at a relatively low cost, allowing for a rapid military expansion in the likely scenario of war on the continent. Nowhere was this method of military strategy more apparent than in the two German states. The West German Bundeswehr relied significantly on conscripts and trained hundreds of thousands of soldiers annually.
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union on December 25th, 1991, the primary threat across Europe was eliminated. Consequently, European states could no longer justify spending billions of dollars annually on defence. Most European states moved from relying on mass conscription and large armies to focusing on small, specialised and well-trained forces. These would be best suited for reactions to less existential threats and worked well when deployed to the Balkans in the late 90s and to Afghanistan in the wake of the September 11th attacks. Further to this end in the new unipolar world order, it was believed that the United States would act as the guarantor of European security through the NATO alliance. France and Spain ended conscription in 2001, Italy in 2005 and Germany in 2011.
Another significant factor that contributed to the end of conscription across Europe was the theory of ‘Post-Heroic Warfare’ as put forward by Edward Luttwak. In this theory national citizens have a significantly lower tolerance for the mass loss of life, especially in light of modern technology. Generally, the public are more in favour of long-distance warfare through the deployment of smart technologies such as drones and precision air strikes. Another aspect of this is the preferred policy of the avoidance of mass mobilisation, and the hijacking of the economy and the formation of a war economy. Coupling with these factors it remains true that since the turn of the century citizens are far less willing to volunteer for military service or to give their life for their country.
In 2026 conscription has become politically and culturally obsolete. Today it is deemed largely unnecessary and expensive when compared to modern methods of waging war. Conscription is also significantly inefficient; it costs significantly more to train 3 conscripted soldiers than it does to train 1 volunteer to control a drone. Conscription is also very politically polarising with older citizens strongly in favour of conscription while young people, aged between 16-24, poll aggressively against conscription.
The Invasion of Crimea and Security Shocks
In February 2014 the Russian Federation fuelled opposition groups in Ukrainian controlled Crimea. Subsequent unrest and disorder, together with political manipulation, contributed to Russian armed forces entering Crimea on the 26th of February. Subsequently Crimea was annexed by Russia and has since then remained under the control of Russian forces as a de facto Russian territory.
The invasion of internationally recognised Ukrainian territory acted as a watershed moment for several European states. This was the first instance where a major global power has acted against another European state since the time of the Cold War. It was also here where Europe decided to start developing some military independence from the United States.
This is to say that the Russian invasion of Crimea was an event which changed the perception of what constituted real threats to European states. For the past 20 years the European community had been fighting battles largely overseas or against forces severely out matched by European military capacity. This changed in 2014, the threat was a major power, with the capacity to bring war to the fields, lakes and mountains of Europe once again.
The Recruitment Crisis
While the invasion of Crimea acted as a short-term catalyst for a change in policy a more existential problem has gripped Europe in the time since 1991. That being the lack of new recruits. Put simply, the younger generations have grown without the threat of interstate wars between European states. This has been primarily caused by the growing proportion of the population, primarily younger people, who do not feel a duty to fight for their country.
As a consequence of this the military has seen a significant decrees in enlistments, meaning few new troops are joining the armed forces. At the same time older soldiers are leaving the armed forces, either retiring or leaving to pursue careers in the private sector. The first point refers to the aging population of Europe. In order to sustain or grow a regions population at least 2 children must be born between each couple, in the past ten years the European birthrate has fallen to ~1.51 children per family. This is to say there are simply less people aged between 18-24 to join the armed forces, shrinking the pool from which people may volunteer to join the military. The second point refers to the pay differences between public and private sectors; this wage gap is a major factor drawing ageing service people out of the army. Simply rising costs have not been matched by rises in wages, pushing people to seek higher paying work.
The New models of conscription
Since the 2014 invasion several European nations have introduced conscription policies to help bolster their armed forces in the anticipation of a possible conflict with Russia or any other actor. This new wave of conscription is however not a return to the conscription seen during the 20th century. Contemporary methods of conscription are more selective, flexible and politically adapted to best serve each respective nation. Modern conscription does not rely on the mass mobilisation of the past but rather on the selection of a certain subset of the population. This is reinforced by new policies of limited service where service members join the armed forces for short spans of time, say a year, instead of the indefinite conscription of the past.
The most common form of modern conscription in Europe is selective and limited conscripting. This is a system where only a small proportion of each age cohort is actually conscripted. In this method of conscription an entire age group is screened for their suitability for military service, this often references their educational level, physical fitness and mental dexterity. Those who are selected under this form of conscription then follow a short training period where basic military skills are acquired, in a form of boot camp. The short training process can last between 6 to 12 months and focus on providing soldiers with intensive and specialised training. This form of conscription is most commonly seen when nations attempt to bolster their reserve forces, once the training period is over it is common for the individual to remain as a reserve in the armed forces until they age out of legal conscription age.
The universal training model has a nation focus on broad, if not full, participation without full militarisation. Many of the features of limited conscription are used in this method, in addition to this however civilians can opt out of direct military service and can instead enrol in the civil service or emergence services. In any case, service in this system is either short term, or a part time commitment where service people will be able to continue working or studying outside their national service. This method of conscription is often viewed through the lens of citizenship building; by mandating service the state can grow identification with the state. This makes it more likely that citizens will volunteer in case of war. This form of conscription has been exemplified in states including France, Poland and Belgium.
Case Study: Sweden
Sweden has acted as a type of prototype for how a modern form of conscription can be introduced on a national level. Sweden’s system is purposefully highly selective and designed to be limited to only some parts of the population. Sweden originally established conscription in 1901 with some 85% of the male population serving in the armed forces during the Cold War. This practice was ended in 2010 when the Riksdag, Swedish Parliament, established a gender-neutral conscription system while at the same time suspending the practice outright.
It is important to note that Sweden only suspended conscription which left the road to reverse its course open. Sweden’s main catalyst for reintroducing conscription was the Russian invasion of Crimea, this raised major security concerns. This is specifically caused by the short distance between Sweden and Russia, being just 4.5 nautical miles across the Baltic Sea.
Rather than returning to the old system of conscription as described above, Sweden reactivated a gender-neutral system of selection. All 18-year-olds are assessed annually with an estimated 3-8% of the cohort being selected per annum, each cohort is roughly 100,000 citizens. Sweden’s system also emphasises total defence, where conscripts may also enter non-military roles in times of crisis.
Sweden has demonstrated that conscription can be politically viable when modern alterations are made to the system of conscription. This is vital information for other nations to move back towards conscription. This system also allows for countries to build national military reserves in preparation for any crisis that may come up. The Swedish system is gender neutral, where male and female candidates are equally likely to be conscripted. This policy, first enacted by Norway in 2013, dramatically expands to cohorts from which recruits can be taken.
A politically contentious issue
The issue of conscription is one which is among the most politically volatile in modern politics, especially in the western world. Despite the growing concerns around European security, support for conscription has not grown concurrently, instead becoming deeply contentious across many European countries. A legitimacy gap has started to grow between state security policy and public attitudes towards conscription, in modern liberal states there is serious discourse around the necessity for state security and the continued autonomy of a state’s citizens.
The civil-military relationship has been under strain in recent times; scholars Samual Huntington and Morris Janowitz offer contrasting opinions on this relationship. Huntington argues that modern democracies work best with professional, apolitical armed forces. He emphasises that a modern military force should be composed of specialised volunteers, this increases efficiency of military operations and often reduces capsulitis. Moreover, by having volunteers this assures that civilians remain in control of the armed forces and avoids the politicisation of the armed forces with only one group of people being conscripted. Janowitz offers a contradiction point, he argues that the armed forces should represent society, while retaining a strong professional force. He argues universal conscription strengthens links between military and society which is key for the furthering of a state’s interests. Post cold war favours Huntington’s model, conscription today raises questions about state authority and the rights of self-determination each citizen should have.
Another divide which polarises the issue of conscription is that of the generational divide. Ronald Inglehart introduces a post materialist thesis that states that older generations, who were shaped by war and scarcity are more likely to prioritise security and defence over social issues. Younger people, raised in stability, are generally more interested in freedom, self-expression and quality of life and are hence less willing the serve in the military, viewing their safety as a given. This division creates a clear voter divide, when polled 63% of British adults aged over 65 are in favour of universal conscription. Conversely 65% of people aged between 18-24 oppose conscription. This divide makes tackling conscription electorally challenging with any politician risking losing major proportions of the population when they take a position on this issue.
Ole Wæver’s securitisation theory proposes that governments will be able to gain support for any issue, in this case conscription, by successfully framing the growing threat to national security as an existential threat to society. If they are successful a government would be able to gain support for extraordinary measures, think of the 2001 PATRIOT Act for instance.
Examples – UK
On the 26th of May 2024 then British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak announced that as part of the conservatives parties’ electoral manifesto would be the return to universal conscription. This practice had been abolished in 1963 leading many scholars and voters alike to ponder the intention behind this announcement. Most agree that this was a move designed to boost the conservatives in the polls, this had a rather opposite effect dropping the conservatives to a mere 25% approve compared to labours 45%. This result can be attributed to several factors.
Generational opposition was primary among the factors that contributed to the support collapse, those voters who were directly affected by this announcement and who had been sitting on the fence were pushed towards labour and other opposition parties. This was paired with the securance of the older vote, which the conservatives didn’t really need to secure. Younger people largely viewed the reasons for the introduction of conscription as ultimately unjustified.
Equally the new proposed conscription law would be a form of coercive conscription. While other countries like Sweden had slowly rolled out their conscription program to ease the population into the new reality the United Kingdom proposed a onetime bill for full conscription, for both the armed forces and civil service. Many viewed this act as a form of state overreach. This further grew resentment to the long unpopular conservative government.
Ultimately, the British proposal for conscription was stopped dramatically when the labour party won a majority at the 2024 general election. While it is true other factors contributed to the collapse of the conservative government, the introduction of conscription to the party manifesto acted as a firm catalyst for the further loss of the young vote.
Is Europe really returning to conscription?
Despite the growing discussion across Europe of conscription, it is misleading to characterise current developments as a full-scale return. It is true that some nations, some activists and some politicians are in favour of a return to conscription that will not take the form of the past. In the place of the old uniform conscription model, we have shown new models can take its place and can best serve each respective nation.
The current discourse around conscription cannot be labelled as a return for a plethora of reasons. First, we must consider the lack of uniformity which this so-called return has taken. While it remains true that some nations, particularly to the east, have introduced active systems of conscription: Sweden and Lithuania for instance. These systems are counter balanced by other nations choosing other paths. Of the 32 member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization only 9 have active conscription laws (as of 5thDecember 2025). Other states choose different paths. Germany for instance has seen debate covering this issue in the past couple months but has seen no tangible efforts to return to the practice of mass conscription. Equally the United Kingdom outright rejected conscription during the 2024 general elections. These highlight a fragmented European policy as opposed to a full return.
For scenarios where there is the political will to introduce conscription other hurdles are faced. For instance, while there is a growing movement to return to conscription in Germany the state lacks the proper infrastructure to support the proposed expansion of its armed forces. Modern militaries are not designed for mass intake or high growth rates but rather for small, highly specialised armies.
Conscription in the 21st century is vastly different to what it has been in the past, what was once common practice has become obsolete. The new methods of conscription mentioned above will help usher in a new age of military expansion despite the challenges highlighted in this text.
Conclusion
Europe is not returning to the conscription of a by-gone era, it instead moves forward into the challenges of the 21st century prepared and willing to adapt conscription into a policy that can be accepted by the masses. It is true that some hurdles must be overcome in order to achieve these new policies, but these are hurdles that can be outweighed by great security shocks, structural pressures and the changing nature of warfare. A shift away from mass mobilisation can be observed with nations choosing to train specialised, smaller armies instead. A generational divide remains prevalent across Europe and governments face legitimacy crises where citizens question their right to mandate military service. This is all to say, conscription is a tool which is being redefined in the modern era, and its future is highly dependent on the threats Europe faces in the future and how these are perceived.
Conscription returns, but has been transformed by modern threats, society and politics.
Photo by Filip Andrejevic via https://unsplash.com/photos/men-in-green-and-brown-camouflage-uniform-1LTunOck3es
