Since the beginning of the 12th century, Ireland has been perpetually under the dominion of Britain. While now it is only a small severance of Ireland that remains domiciled with its former coloniser, many within the Republic continue to see this as an affront to Irish independence, even after more than 100 years since the creation of the Irish Free State under the Anglo-Irish Treaty. As such, advocacy for reunification has been a continual subject brought into the glare of many a political party’s elective debate, politician’s list of promises and public discussion. Yet, despite its seemingly popular demand within the Republic, Northern Ireland has been notoriously at odds with approval for reunification. However, recent changes have given renewed vigour to the nationalist hope that Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland will soon reunite after more than a century of political, economic and religious estrangement. But its culmination rests centrally on the calling of a border poll in which a ‘yes on reunification’ consensus is determined on both sides of the splinter.
The existence of the border poll and the nature of when it may be called can be discerned as a product of the resolution of The Troubles. In 1921, Ireland was partitioned based on the embedded national divide between protestants of Ulster-plantation descent and the predominant ‘native’ catholics, whose feud arose from the colonial Protestant Anglo settlers seizing land from the Catholics. This severance created Northern Ireland, made up of the six counties wherein Protestants were a majority, and the 26 remaining counties composed the Republic of Ireland. But even this divide did not cease religious and historical animosity between the Catholics and Protestants, as within Northern Ireland grew a civil rights movement for the underrepresented and discriminated Catholic minority residing there in the late 1960s. This culminated in a series of conflicts between the Nationalist Catholics, who were campaigning for the end of partition, and the Unionist Protestants, who wished to preserve their position within the United Kingdom. The brutality of these conflicts, violently supported by the IRA (Provisional Irish Republican Army), urgently required a resolution, which was concluded in 1998 with the Good Friday Agreement. The IRA was a paramilitary group which formed in Northern Ireland in 1919 with the aim of freeing Ireland from British rule. Indeed, it helped secure the terms negotiated with Britain for the Irish Free State in 1921 through its guerrilla war against British troops during the Irish War of Independence (1919-1921). However, the IRA later split during The Troubles, into the Provisional, “Provos”, and the Official factions, both having the same objective of uniting Ireland. Controversially, the Provos pursued terrorist tactics from 1970 and killed many, finally being decommissioned in an arduous process ending in 2005. But the IRA’s impact on the inception of the Good Friday Agreement allowed for the establishment of a devolved government for Northern Ireland, recognition of the complexity of people’s identities being Irish and/or British, and arguably most significantly, the ability of self-determination. This milestone achievement materialised in the form of a border poll, which is called when the UK Secretary of State for Northern Ireland believes that there is sufficient support for reunification on both sides of the isle, with simultaneous polls being arranged in the Republic and Northern Ireland in order to determine a collective consensus. However, while a successful border poll has yet to be accomplished, wherein both sides are in consensus on reunification, recent events and new changes have increased the feasibility that a border poll may be called to irrevocably unite Ireland.
Historically, as exemplified by The Troubles, the national divide, fueled and symbolised by religious differences between Protestants and Catholics, has acted as the reason for those six counties to be specifically cut from the rest of Ireland. As such, many have considered it difficult, if not inconceivable, to reconcile Protestant Unionists, who grasp tightly to the flag pole of the United Kingdom, with the idea of stripping their British identity and merging with deeply Catholic Ireland. However, in spite of this historically staunch opposition to unification, demographic changes suggest that unification may be embraced by a larger population of Northern Ireland than previously conceived. Despite the short epoch of Northern Ireland’s existence being continually punctuated by the pervasive enmity between Protestant Unionists and Catholic Nationalists, so recognised by their polarised religious denominations, has recently declined as a clear dichotomy. Indeed, demographic changes have altered Northern Ireland’s religious scape, majorly the number of people identifying with no particular religion. Regarding this, there has been a notable increase in the number of those identifying as “no religion”, from 9 per cent in 1998 to 20 per cent in 2018. This development has been correlated with the shifted demography of Northern Ireland, wherein younger generations have grown up in an era of improved secularism and peace without the religiously-charged taint of The Troubles in their direct memory. This means that their views are likely less constrained by historical prejudices that have acted before as barriers to unity. Indeed, this idea has been indicated by 2023 polling, which suggests that there is a decrease in the number of people who find the notion of a unification referendum completely unacceptable. This may also be a result of the marginally higher number of Catholics in Northern Ireland than Protestants for the first time in 2022. Thus, this clear demographic shift to a secular society, wherein religious differences play a less determinative role and even where religion applies, the rising equality between Catholics and Protestants will be positive, meaning that history will no longer loom so heavily over votes in support of reunification.
Politically too, shifts in political standings within both the Republic of Ireland and the Northern Ireland Executive, Northern Ireland’s governing body, have aided in the facilitation of a reunification referendum. Indeed, the rise of Sinn Féin in Northern Ireland, from being initially a political branch tied to the IRA to the largest party in the Northern Irish Assembly in 2022, has been significant for the cause of reunification. Sinn Féin’s role was historically characterised as the political wing of the Provisional IRA faction, indeed Sinn Féin’s representatives signed the Anglo-Irish Treaty in 1921, collaborating with the IRA, to end the Irish Independence War. But in the 1990s it began emphasising its nonassociation with the IRA, especially after discrimination against its inclusion as a political party in the British parliament during the 1970s, because of its alleged collusion with the IRA. Despite this pronounced distinctiveness, Sinn Féin continued, and has continued, to strive for the same goal as the IRA: Irish unification. Finally, in 2000, after much effort, it became a fully included member of the Northern Ireland Executive. Thus, with its history in consideration, Sinn Féin’s victory in yielding the most seats in the Assembly had been thought as unthinkable for what was once declared a permanently Protestant, unionist remnant within Ireland’s fragmentation. But contrarily, there has been a continued decline in unionist parties within Northern Ireland by a full 10 per cent in 2023. Therefore, the prominence of Sinn Féin’s achievement has been coupled with renewed hopes for reunification, as it has continued to maintain its primary goal of reunifying Ireland, with its election of first minister Michelle O’Neill in 2024 providing momentum to this patriotic tenet. Indeed, Sinn Féin even warned that a call for a reunification referendum is looming, with its MP Dáire Hughes recently declaring in November 2025 that preparations for this referendum will begin now without delay. This followed a motion passed by Sinn Féin in Dáil Éireann calling on the Irish government to begin preparing.
Politically in the Republic of Ireland, the recent election of President Catherine Connolly this year has been portentous for reinvigorating the drive for reunification on the republican side of the isle. Indeed, while there are two leading roles in the Republic of Ireland, with the Taoiseach (Prime Minister) holding decisive power and the role of President being largely symbolic, President Connolly is an important catalyst for a referendum call, acting as a visible figurehead for the cause. Certainly, Connolly is emblematic of this goal due to her assertion that reunification has always been an objective for her, seeing it as inevitable and a ‘foregone conclusion’. Many have thus claimed that her victory has brought optimism for those in favour of Irish unity, with some even arguing that the cause has more political momentum in the Republic than it has had in years because of her election. Currently, polling in the Republic suggests that firmly two-thirds of voters say they will support unification, showing its continued popularity, especially with more politicians and parties joining in on this call for a referendum. Indeed, the leader of the Irish Labour Party, Ivana Bacik, has called for the UK and Irish governments to confirm a timeline for a border poll, and the former Taoiseach, Leo Varadkar, also urged the Republic to begin plans.
Economically speaking, additionally, the recent departure of the UK from the EU in 2020 has inadvertently become the most successful campaign for Irish unity in Northern Ireland. Indeed, the economic conditions on each side of the isle were already vastly different, as since the early 1990s, Ireland has been experiencing consistent economic growth; even undergoing a period aptly labelled the ‘Celtic Tiger’ between 1994-2007, where its economic condition boomed with substantial inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI). In contrast to this, Northern Ireland has been experiencing a downward economic spiral, being notably designated the poorest region of the UK. As such, with Brexit, Northern Ireland’s economic plight has only suffered, at a cost not purposefully borne by itself, as just over half of the province, in fact, voted against the exit from the EU. This is complicated, too, by the fact that Northern Ireland’s relaxed border relationship with the Republic, a product of the Good Friday Agreement, meant it had to remain in the EU’s Single Market model and thus endure extra customs procedures to protect this access. Yet because of this dual environment, the North’s economy is as much integrated with the Republic as with the UK, with trade between the North and South only increasing from €2 billion in 1998 to more than €10 billion in 2022. Thus, attachment to the Republic in this manner, with access still to its Single Market, proffers the North with the advantage of being reintegrated into the EU with ease. With these factors in mind, with both the North’s rejection of Brexit as well as the economic boom the Republic has had in contrast to the North’s decline, the prospect of a referendum is much more plausible for the North to support. Moreover, the oft-cited objection dispensed about the economic burden that would have to be shouldered by the Republic if the indebted North were to unite with it has, in truth, been revealed as exaggerated. This is because Ireland’s budget surpluses and strong economy mean the costs would likely amount to only a few percentage points of gross domestic product; integration costs could be very well managed without Ireland’s economy suffering as a result.
While these political, economic and historical aspects appear to be symptomatic of a referendum to be called anon, difficulties still crop up to obscure the success of reunification. Chiefly, the Good Friday Agreement failed to provide much detail delineating how the Secretary of State would gauge if a majority within Northern Ireland support Irish reunification. This means that certain descriptors cannot be referred to or used to measure if enough in Northern Ireland appear to strive for reunification. This allows for the Secretary of State, who is elected by the British Monarch, who decides by advice of the UK prime minister, to stall and/or refuse to call a referendum based on his/her own, potentially biased, judgment that not enough support it. This has even been reflected by the current UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer, claiming that a referendum is ‘not even on the horizon’, conveying the UK’s firm dismissal of Northern Ireland parting from the enclosure of its Kingdom, and denoting how the Secretary of State will at present proceed. Moreover, questions have been raised about the ramifications of a referendum that produces a pro-unity result, as to how the unionists can be integrated into this new Ireland. Significant thought must be given towards proper preparation, not only for the North and South’s organisational integration, but also on the people’s integration into this union, so as to avoid another conflict similar to that of The Troubles. With this in mind, many Northern Irish residents who still maintain their unionist position act as a barrier to a united Ireland. Thus, without persistent and collective calls for a referendum by a majority of the public, the UK government and Northern Irish Executive will likely delay any talk of a referendum. As such, these obstructions thus impede how soon one can expect a referendum to be called, and while many factors indicate a positive outlook for the near future, these hindrances must be primarily considered and dealt with immediately.
To conclude on the central question posed since the signing of the Good Friday Agreement, on whether a referendum and consequential unity is feasible within the next decade, it appears to be hopeful in favour of significant moves made towards a referendum being held at the end of this decade. Indeed, while Northern Ireland has a changed demographic, a pro-nationalist political party in the forefront of the Northern Ireland Assembly, and a positive economic ascent if it were to join Ireland (and by extension, the EU), these factors are paired with notable impediments associated with difficulties calling the border poll and staunchly opposed unionists. As such, this question begs further assessment of how Northern Ireland may adjust to Brexit’s changes in the next decade; either catalysing a referendum or embedding Northern Ireland further into the United Kingdom’s fold if its economy becomes more isolationist with the UK.
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